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You Said You Were Going to Do What to My Loan? The
Inequitable Doctrine of Recharacterization
Hilary A. Goehausen*
I. INTRODUCTION
A new development in bankruptcy law has potential lenders and
financially troubled companies on edge. Bankruptcy courts are con-
flicted, practitioners are concerned, and potential lenders may be hit-
ting the brakes.1 Perceived as menacing by bankruptcy practitioners,
but a "tool de jour" among bankruptcy trustees, a recent judicially
created device known as recharacterization may turn the commercial
lending and bankruptcy worlds on their head.2 Regarded as an "equi-
table" remedy, recharacterization is a process by which bankruptcy
courts convert a purported loan, or an advance of money that the par-
ties have characterized as debt, into an equity contribution.3 When a
court determines that a loan is actually a capital contribution, it then
subordinates this "equity investment" behind all other debts and obli-
gations of the debtor-corporation. 4 In bankruptcy, an equity holder
will be the last to be repaid from the bankruptcy estate and realisti-
cally has little, if any, prospect of being repaid.5
Debt-to-equity recharacterization has quickly become a fundamen-
tal weapon in the arsenal of creditors and trustees when perusing ave-
nues through which to subordinate the claims of lenders in corporate
bankruptcy proceedings. 6 The device has been most commonly em-
ployed as a cause of action against corporate insiders and fiduciaries,
* The author would like to thank David Eaton of Kirkland & Ellis in Chicago for introducing
her to the problem of debt to equity recharacterization.
1. James H.M. Sprayregen, J. Friedland, and M. Carmel, Recharacterization from Debt to Eq-
uity: Lenders Beware, 22-9 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 31 (November 2003); see also Jo Ann J.
Brighton, Update: Recharacterization - Practical Pointers in an Evolving Arena, 22-10 AM.
BANKR. INST. J., 2003 ABI JNL. 18, 66 (December 2003).
2. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 31.
3. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 30 n.1, citing AutoStyle Plastics Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 749 (6th Cir.
2001).
4. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, L.P. (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 291 B.R. 314, 322
(Bankr. D. De. 2003).
5. Brighton, supra, note 1, at 67.
6. Jo Ann J. Brighton, Is It a Capital Contribution or a Loan? Update: Recent Cases Discussing
Recharacterization of Debt to Equity, 22-4 Am. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 55 (May 2003).
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such as managers, directors, or shareholders of a corporation, who ad-
vance funds to a financially struggling corporation when no other
sources of outside, arm's-length financing are available.7 In bank-
ruptcy, a trustee of the bankruptcy estate or creditors committee as-
serts that the insider-lender's advances are, in actuality, disguised
capital contributions and should be subordinated as such.8
The utilization of recharacterization in bankruptcy proceedings is
spawning fiery debates among bankruptcy practioners, overreaching
by bankruptcy courts, and unpredictability in lending relationships. 9
Despite its label as "equitable," recharacterization fails to produce an
outcome in accordance with the broad equitable mandate of bank-
ruptcy courts. Moreover, recharacterization is not an authorized use
of bankruptcy courts' equitable powers. The result achieved by con-
verting debt into capital is neither fair nor just to good-faith corporate
creditors who intended their funding to be a bona fide loan transac-
tion. 10 Most importantly, the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly or
implicitly authorize bankruptcy courts to recharacterize debt.1
This Comment examines whether recharacterization is, fundamen-
tally, an "equitable" remedy authorized by the Bankruptcy Code and
within the scope of bankruptcy courts' equitable mandate. Part II ex-
amines the origins of recharacterization as a distinct legal theory and
equitable remedy in bankruptcy proceedings. Part III analyzes
whether bankruptcy courts' equitable powers under the Code encom-
pass the authority to convert debt as equity. Further, this section eval-
uates whether the outcome achieved by recharacterization provides
"equitable" results for the parties in interest. Part IV discusses the
impact of recharacterization and the ramifications of allowing bank-
ruptcy courts to recast a debt transaction as an equity contribution.
II. BACKGROUND
There is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code that explicitly or im-
plicitly empowers bankruptcy courts with the authority to recharacter-
7. Matthew Nozemack, Making Sense Out of Bankruptcy Courts' Recharacterization of
Claims. Why Not Use §510(c) Equitable Subordination?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 689, 706
(1999).
8. Id. at 706.
9. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 31; see also Brighton, supra note 1, at 66.
10. Throughout this comment "capital contribution" and "equity investment" will be used
interchangeably.
11. Mark G. Douglas, Bankruptcy Court Empowered to Recharacterize Debt as Equity, 2 Bus.
RESTRUCTURING REV. 10, 1 (October 2003), available at http://wwwl.jonesday.com/FILES/tbl-
s3lPublications/FileUploadl37/1017/BR% 20Review %2Vo1% 202% 2ONolO.pdf.
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ize a debt as an equity contribution. 12 Nonetheless, a majority of
bankruptcy courts across the country assert that their power as courts
of equity enable them to hear claims for recharacterization. 13 Specifi-
cally, bankruptcy courts rely on §105 of the Bankruptcy Code, which
grants bankruptcy courts the equitable power to look past the form of
a transaction in order to give effect to its substance. 14 This section
defines recharacterization and discusses how bankruptcy trustees,
creditors, and judges have come to employ the device in bankruptcy
proceedings. Furthermore, this section examines the traditional role
of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity and contrasts recharacteriza-
tion with the traditional equitable remedy of equitable subordination.
Finally, this section examines how recharacterization is commonly uti-
lized to subordinate the debt claims of corporate insiders and
fiduciaries.
A. What is Recharacterization?
Recharacterization of debt as equity is the result of a bankruptcy
court's determination that an advance of money was intended to be an
infusion of equity into a corporation and not a loan.15 In analyzing a
claim for recharacterization, bankruptcy courts aim to provide an "eq-
uitable" remedy whereby capital contributions allegedly camouflaged
as debt are recognized for their true substance and properly subordi-
nated as a proprietary interest in a corporation. 16 Thus, bankruptcy
courts' analysis is said to focus on whether a legitimate debt actually
exists in the first place. 17 When a claim is recharacterized as an equity
investment, the funds advanced are no longer considered to be a debt
that must be repaid in bankruptcy. 18 A debt that is recharacterized as
a capital contribution is subsequently subordinated behind all other
claims because holders of equity are the last to be repaid from the
bankruptcy estate. 19 In bankruptcy, equity holders are rarely repaid
12. Id. at 1.
13. See Brighton, supra note 1, 18 (stating "it is settled, for now at least, that bankruptcy
courts do have the authority to hear recharacterization cases").
14. James H.M. Sprayregen, J. Friedland, and M. Carmel, Recharacterization from Debt to
Equity: Do Bankruptcy Courts Have the Power?, 19 THE BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIST 1 (March
2002).
15. Jo Ann J. Brighton, Capital Contribution or a Loan? A Practical Guide to Analyzing
Recharacterization Claims, 2002 AM. BANKR. INST. J. LEXIS 86 (June 2002), citing In re Autos-
tyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 727, 748 (6th Cir. 2001).
16. Id. at *5.
17. Brighton supra note 1, at 66.
18. 43 BCD News and Comment 14 (September 21, 2004).
19. Nozemack supra note 7, at 716.
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because the estate normally does not have sufficient property to sat-
isfy unsecured creditors' claims. 20
B. The Equitable Mandate of Bankruptcy Courts
Bankruptcy courts are traditionally considered courts of equity, and
their proceedings are inherently deemed to be proceedings in equity.21
As courts of equity, bankruptcy courts are empowered to grant a
broad spectrum of relief in accordance with fundamental notions of
equity and fairness, as opposed to the "principles of black letter
law. '22 When administering a bankruptcy estate, bankruptcy courts'
equitable jurisdiction empowers them to sift through the circum-
stances surrounding a claim in order to ensure that injustice or unfair-
ness does not result.23
Consistent with bankruptcy courts' equitable mandate, judges are
authorized to exercise their own discretion in order to produce just
and fair results to the end that "fraud will not prevail, substance will
not give way to form, and technical considerations will not preclude
substantial justice from being attained. ' 24 In carrying out their equita-
ble mandate, bankruptcy courts are also entitled to test the validity of
claims and, in doing so, are permitted to disregard the form of a trans-
action in order to give effect to its substance.25 However, bankruptcy
courts may only exercise the equitable powers conferred to them by
§105(a) in a manner that is consistent with the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 26 Therefore, as a general rule, bankruptcy courts only
20. Nozemack supra note 7, at 706.
21. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
22. Douglas supra note 11, at 1.
23. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939).
24. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, L.P. (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 291 B.R. 314, 322 (D.
Del. 2003), citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 295.
25. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim? (November 2003), available at http://www.
goodwinprocter.com/publications/IA-DebtClaims11-03.pdf Goodwin Proctor 1, citing In re
SubMicron Sys. Corp., 291 B.R. at 322.
26. In re Morristown & Erie R.R. Co., 885 F.2d 98, 100 (3d. Cir. 1989) ("Section 105(a) autho-
rizes the bankruptcy court... to fashion such orders as are required to further the substantive
provisions of the Code. Section 105(a) gives the court general equitable powers, but only insofar
as those powers are applied in a manner consistent with the Code."); see also Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)(". . .whatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy
Code."); New England Dairies, Inc., v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart
Convenience Stores, Inc.) 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d. Cir. 2003)("The equitable power conferred on the
bankruptcy court by section 105(a) is the power to exercise equity in carrying out the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than to further the purposes of the Code generally, or otherwise
to do the right thing. This language 'suggests that an exercise of section 105 power be tied to
another Bankruptcy Code section and not merely to a general bankruptcy concept or
objective."')
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possess the powers and jurisdiction that are expressly, or by necessary
implication, conferred to them by statute.27 While bankruptcy courts'
authority is arguably exceptionally broad, bankruptcy courts are not
entitled to craft additional substantive rights favoring debtors or credi-
tors that are not already specifically provided for by the Code.28
Moreover, bankruptcy courts may not create substantive rights in
favor of debtors or creditors that do not already exist under non-bank-
ruptcy law.29
The Traditional Remedy of Equitable Subordination
Today, the power of bankruptcy courts to re-order the priority of
claims or interests through the equitable remedy of recharacterization
is generally recognized. 30 However, only the remedy of equitable sub-
ordination is explicitly provided for in the Bankruptcy Code. 31 Al-
though once considered solely in conjunction with the doctrine of
equitable subordination, a majority of bankruptcy courts across the
country now recognize recharacterization as a separate cause of ac-
tion.32 Many courts and practitioners view the doctrine of recharacter-
ization as a variation of equitable subordination regardless of the
doctrine's acceptance as a distinct legal theory and remedy. 33
27. Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983), citing Chicago Bank of
Commerce v. Carter, 61 F.2d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 1932); see also Jones v. Kansas City Garment
Making Co., 1 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1924).
28. Johnson, 719 F.2d at 273; see also In re Transit Group, 286 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. D. Fla.
2002)(". . section 105(a) cannot be used to authorize relief inconsistent with a more specific
provision of the Bankruptcy Code."); In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation, 166 Bankr. 57,
61 (W.D. Pa., 1994)("while the grant of authority is broad, a court may not create substantive
rights in favor of a debtor that are in addition to the rights bestowed by the Code if such rights
do not also exist outside of bankruptcy law."); Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758
F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) ("section 105(a) 'does not AUTHORIZE THe bankruptcy court to
create rights not otherwise available under applicable law."'); United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d
1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (".... statute does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create sub-
stantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under APPLICABLE LAW, or constitute a Roving
commission to do equity.")
29. Johsnson, 719 F.2d at 273; see also Sutton, 786 F.2d at 1308 ("While the bankruptcy courts
have fashioned relief under Section 105(a) in a variety of situations, the powers granted by that
statute may be exercised only in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. That statute does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are
otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.")
30. Douglas, supra note 11, at 1.
31. Id.
32. See Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters.), 158 B.R. 555, 561 (D.R.I. 1993)(stating
"[tihis court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court that the issues of recharacterization of debt as
equity capital and equitable subordination should be treated separately").
33. See Bruce H. White and William L. Medford, Is It More Than Equitable Subordination's
Evil Twin? 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (November 2004).
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Equitable subordination is a remedy used to penalize creditor mis-
conduct that causes injury to other creditors and shareholders of a
company.34 The doctrine is codified in §510(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code, although it first developed as a judicially created remedy
against fraud and breach of fiduciary duties owed to a bankrupt en-
tity.35 Section 510(c) provides that bankruptcy courts may, "under
principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of dis-
tribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another al-
lowed claim or all or part of allowed interest to all or part of another
allowed interest. ' 36 In other words, under a claim for equitable subor-
dination, bankruptcy courts are allowed to subordinate a misbehaving
creditor's claim only to the extent necessary to offset specific harm
suffered by other creditors. 37 Therefore, bankruptcy courts have dis-
cretion to subordinate all, or just a part, of a creditor's claim. 38 Courts
view equitable subordination as a remedial, and not penal, doctrine
that should only be applied in limited circumstances. 39
A claim for equitable subordination usually requires that a creditor
demonstrate three elements: (1) the claimant engaged in some type of
inequitable conduct; (2) the misconduct resulted in injury to the credi-
tors or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; and (3) equita-
ble subordination of the claim is not inconsistent with the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code.40 Further, bankruptcy courts recognize three
general categories of inequitable conduct that warrant the equitable
subordination of a claim: (1) fraud, illegality, and breach of fiduciary
duties; (2) undercapitalization; and (3) a claimant's use of the debtor
as a mere instrumentality or alter ego.41
Bankruptcy courts assert that, while recharacterization involves a
factual determination as to whether or not an asserted debt is in fact a
legitimate debt, equitable subordination is a remedy applied against a
legitimate creditor who has acted inequitably.42 Thus, bankruptcy
courts penalize creditor misconduct by subordinating an otherwise
34. Douglas, supra note 11, at 1.
35. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 311.
36. 11 U.S.C. 510(c)(2005).
37. Trone v. Smith (In re Westgate-California Corp.), 642 F.2d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. Id.
39. Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, Inc.), 868 F.2d 146, 148-149 (5th Cir. 1989).
40. Citicorp Venture Capital v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160 F.3d 982,
986-87 (3d Cir. 1998), citing United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 134 L. Ed. 2d 748, 116 S. Ct.
1524 (1996); see also Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, L.P. (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 291
B.R. 314, 329 (Bankr. D. De. 2003).
41. In re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458, 1467 (5th Cir. 1991).
42. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 30, citing In re Outboard Marine Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. 12564,
13 (E.D. Ill. July 21, 2003).
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valid, superior claim behind those claims of unsecured creditors.43 On
the other hand, bankruptcy courts assert that a debt is recharacterized
as a capital investment after finding that there was never a valid debt
in the first place. 44 Thus, when a court recharacterizes a debt, it "rec-
ognizes" the true character of the claim and properly converts it as a
proprietary interest.45 Therefore, recharacterization claims are said to
focus on whether a legitimate debt actually exists, while equitable sub-
ordination depends on whether there was creditor misconduct.46
C. The Devotees of Recharacterization
As previously discussed, there is no provision in the Bankruptcy
Code that authorizes bankruptcy courts to recharacterize debt as eq-
uity.47 Nevertheless, a majority of bankruptcy courts across the coun-
try maintain that their equitable powers under the Bankruptcy Code
authorize them to hear claims for recharacterization. 48 Adherents of
recharacterization rely on §105 of the Bankruptcy Code, which refers
to the general equitable powers of bankruptcy courts.49 Section 105
states that bankruptcy judges have the authority to "issue any order,
process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions" of the Code. 50
Bankruptcy courts argue that the ability to recharacterize a pur-
ported loan as an equity contribution emanates from their equitable
power to ignore the form of a transaction in order to give effect to its
substance.5 ' These courts assert that the issue in recharacterization is
not whether funds advanced to a corporation are actually loans, but
whether equity requires that they be regarded as if they were some-
thing else.52 As the court in Cold Harbor53 stated, "a court is not re-
quired to accept the label of 'debt' or 'equity' placed by the debtor
upon a particular transaction, but must inquire into the actual nature
43. Brighton, supra note 15, at *5.
44. Id. at *6.
45. Id. at *5.
46. Id.
47. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim?, supra note 25.
48. Id.; see also In re Herby's Foods, 2 F.3d 128, 144 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Midtown Product
Terminal Inc., 599 F.2d 389, 393 (10th Cir. 1979); Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enterprises),
158 B.R. 555, 561-62 (D.R.I. 1993); In re Cold Harbor Assocs., 204 B.R. 904, 915 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1997); Diasonics Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990).
49. Douglas, supra note 11, at 2.
50. 11 U.S.C. 510(c) (2005).
51. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, L.P. (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 291 B.R. 314, 322
(Bankr. D. De. 2003), citing In re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458, 1469 (5th Cir. 1991).
52. In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 702 (5th Cir. 1977).
53. In re Cold Harbor Assocs., 204 B.R. 904, 915(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
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of a transaction to determine how best to characterize it." Therefore,
bankruptcy courts assert that, in analyzing claims for recharacteriza-
tion, they are testing the validity of a debt and in doing so, are permit-
ted by their powers of equity to disregard the form of a transaction in
order to recognize its true substance as an equity investment.54
D. Unauthorized Use of Bankruptcy Courts' Authority?
There do remain a few "hold-out" courts that maintain recharacter-
ization is an unauthorized exercise of bankruptcy courts' authority.55
These courts assert that there is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code
that empowers courts with the authority to recharacterize a claim.56
Opponents of recharacterization opine that, while §105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code gives bankruptcy courts broad power to "issue any
order,, process or judgment that is necessary to carry out the provi-
sions" of the Bankruptcy Code, there is no provision, or implicit refer-
ence, in the Code that allows for recharacterization. 57 Further,
opponents argue that bankruptcy courts' powers under §105 are re-
stricted to carrying out the substantive provisions of the Code, and
since there is no explicit provision in the Code authorizing
recharacterization, the remedy is outside the scope of bankruptcy
courts' powers.58 Accordingly, opponents argue that Congress in-
tended to deprive bankruptcy courts of the power to recharacterize
debt since §510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code contains a specific provi-
sion authorizing equitable subordination, but contains no provision
pertaining to a remedy of recharacterization.5 9 Thus, opponents argue
that, based on the principle of "expressio unius est exclusion alter-
ius," 60 Congress did not intend to permit bankruptcy courts to possess
54. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim?, supra note 25.
55. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 30.
56. Brighton, supra note 15, at 1, citing In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (9th Cir.
B.A.P. 1986) (". .. the court has construed its authority too broadly. While the Code supports the
court's ability to determine the amount and the allowance or disallowance of claims, those provi-
sions do not provide for the characterization of claims as equity or debt. The result achieved by
such a determination, i.e. subordination, is governed by 11 U.S.C. Section 510(c). Where there is
a specific provision governing these determinations, it is inconsistent with the interpretation of
the Bankruptcy Code to allow such determinations to be made under different standards
through the use of the court's equitable powers."); see also In re Pine Tree Partners, Ltd., 87 B.R.
481, 491 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) ("The equitable powers of the court derive from the Bank-
ruptcy Code and consequently reach no further than its provisions. Accordingly, the claims of
OTR are not subject to recharacterization from debt to equity absent controlling provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code.")
57. Brighton, supra note 15, at *1.
58. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 30.
59. Id.
60. "The express mention of one thing implies exclusion of all others"
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the power to recharacterize debt.61 Moreover, the hold-out courts
maintain that since the result achieved by recharacterization is subor-
dination of a claim, and such determinations are governed by the ex-
press provision of §510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, it is inconsistent
with the Code to allow such determinations to be made under differ-
ent standards via the court's equitable powers.62
In re Outboard Marine Corp. 63
In 2002, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Illi-
nois boldly dissociated itself with the majority of courts that recognize
a power to recharacterize debt and stated that recharacterization of
debt as equity was outside the scope of bankruptcy courts' powers.
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court refused to recharacterize the
lender's debt claim. In Outboard Marine Corp., Outboard Marine
granted a security interest in substantially all of its assets to secure
loans made in 1998.64 Two years later, Quantum Industrial Partners
acquired nearly all of Outboard Marine's stock for more than $40 mil-
lion. 65 Afterwards, OutBoard Marine and its lenders amended their
loan agreement to add an additional debt subordinate to Outboard
Marine's existing debt.66 Quantum then purchased a 100 percent par-
ticipation interest in the subordinated debt and assigned its rights
against Outboard Marine to the lead bank lender.67 After Outboard
Marine filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bank sought to collect on
its secured claims. The trustee countersued the bank and Quantum,
asserting that Outboard Marine's $45 million debt to Quantum be
recharacterized as an equity interest in the company.68 The trustee ar-
gued that the transaction involving the bank, Quantum, and Outboard
Marine was in reality an equity investment disguised as a participation
interest in a loan.69
Judge Barliant of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois declined to recharacterize the debt, stating that: "There
is no basis in bankruptcy law to recharacterize a debt as equity.. In
my opinion, no bankruptcy court has the power to do any such thing
61. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 30.
62. See In re Pinetree Partners Ltd., 87 B.R. at 491; see also In re Pacific Express Inc., 69 B.R.
at 115.
63. In re Outboard Marine Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. 12564 (E.D. Ill. 2003).
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under the Bankruptcy Code."' 70 Judge Barliant reasoned that while
§105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code grants bankruptcy courts the broad
authority to "issue any order, process or judgment," such authority
may only be exercised "to carry out the provisions" of the Code.71 On
appeal, however, the District Court reversed Judge Barliant's decision
and allied itself with the majority of courts that have expansively con-
strued the scope of bankruptcy courts' equitable powers.72 The Dis-
trict Court remanded the case back to the bankruptcy court and
ordered it to exercise its authority to determine whether the facts and
circumstances justified recharacterization. 73
In 2003, Judge Doyle of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois followed in Judge Barliant's footsteps by dis-
missing a claim for recharacterization in In re Abtox. 74 Referring to
the language used by Judge Barliant in Outboard Marine, Judge Doyle
stated that "there is nothing anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code that
authorizes converting a claim into an equity interest for any reason
whatsoever. ' 75 By referring to Judge Barliant's opinion, it is argued
that Judge Doyle may be resurrecting the debate that emerged early
during recharacterization cases and seems to have been settled by a
majority of courts.76 Despite the stance of the hold-out courts, how-
ever, it is settled, for the time being, that bankruptcy courts possess
the authority to hear recharacterization claims. 77
E. The Test for Recharacterization
Recharacterization involves a factual determination by bankruptcy
courts as to the "real" substance and nature of the agreement between
the parties. 78 Primarily, bankruptcy courts are concerned with deter-
mining whether a transaction reflects the characteristics of an arm's-
70. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 30, citing In re Outboard Marine Corp., Case No. 00 B 37405
(Bankr. N.D. Il. Jan. 14, 2002) (Barliant, J.).
71. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 30.
72. Douglas, supra note 11, at 2.
73. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 30.
74. In re Abtox Inc. (Ross v. H & 0 Life Science Investors, H&Q Healthcare Investors), Adv.
No. 00 A 00661 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), citing In re Outboard Marine Corp., Case No. 00 B 37405
(Bankr. N.D. Il. Jan. 14, 2002) (Barliant, J.).
75. Brighton, supra note 7, at 54-55 (quoting Judge Barliant's oral opinion in In re Outboard
Marine Corp.)
76. Id. ("Judge Doyle, by incorporation of Judge Barliant's oral opinion, is resurrecting the
debate that arose early in these cases and seems to be squarely settled by Autostyle Plastics and
its progeny. It should be interesting to see if these types of arguments will begin to be raised one
again.")
77. Brighton, supra note 15, at *2-3.
78. 43 BCD News and Comment 14, supra note 18.
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length negotiation.79 Thus, courts are more willing to recharacterize a
transaction that does not bear the indicia or characteristics of an
arm's-length transaction. 80
The factors that bankruptcy courts evaluate when analyzing claims
for recharacterization generally fall into three categories.81 First,
courts consider the formality of the alleged loan agreement. 82 For ex-
ample, in In re Cold Harbor, the court stated that when parties to a
transaction are more specific and complete in identifying and codify-
ing the terms of their alleged loan agreement, the more like a loan the
transaction appears.83 By contrast, however, if the terms of a loan
agreement are vague and non-specific, the transaction will appear
more like a capital contribution. 84 Second, bankruptcy courts consider
the financial situation of a company at the time a purported loan
agreement is created.8 5 If investment in a corporation appears to have
been especially risky or the source of funds to repay a loan was not
clearly made, then a court will be persuaded that the transaction bears
the earmarks of an equity contribution.8 6 Finally, bankruptcy courts
consider the relationship between the creditor and the debtor.87 For
example, when a lender obtains a right to control a company's opera-
tions or participate in management, bankruptcy courts consider this
indicative of an ownership interest in a company and not simply a
debtor-creditor relationship. 8
In evaluating the aforementioned categories, bankruptcy courts are
guided by what are known as the Autostyle Plastics factors. These fac-
tors were originally employed by the tax courts when determining
whether to recharacterize a claim in the tax context. 89 In Autostyle
Plastics, Inc., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals drew on the tax
courts' factors in order to formulate a framework for analyzing
79. Brighton, supra note 15, at *2; see also In re Cold Harbor Assocs., 204 B.R. 904,
915(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) ("The primary factor this Court is to consider when evaluating
whether funds advanced by a shareholder are the result of an equity contribution or a loan is
whether the transaction bears the earmarks of an arm's length negotiation").
80. Brighton, supra note 15, at *2.




85. Id. citing In re Cold Harbor Assocs., 204 B.R. 904, 916(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
86. In re Cold Harbor Assocs., 204 B.R. at 916; see also Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner,
800 F.2d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1986).
87. see Diasonics Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 629-32 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that
when the putative claimant advanced funds to the debtor, no other disinterested lender would
extend equivalent credit, which holding supported the recharacterization of debt to equity).
88. In re Cold Harbor Assocs., 204 B.R. at 917.
89. Roth Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d at 630-32.
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recharacterization claims in bankruptcy contexts.90 The court deter-
mined that the factors formulated for analyzing recharacterization
claims in the tax context were also appropriate when analyzing
recharacterization claims in the bankruptcy context. 91 Thus, bank-
ruptcy courts adopted the following factors as guideposts in determin-
ing the "true nature" of a claim: (1) the names given to the
instruments, if any, which evidence the indebtedness; (2) presence of
absence of a fixed maturity date and scheduled payments; (3) the
presence or absence of a fixed rate of interest and interest payments;
(4) the source of repayments; (5) the adequacy or inadequacy of capi-
talization; (6) the identity of interest between the creditor and the
stockholder; (7) the security, if any, for the advances made; (8) a cor-
poration's ability to obtain financing from outside lending institutions;
(9) the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital as-
sets; (10) the extent to which the advances were subordinated to the
claims of outside creditors; and (11) the presence or absence of a sink-
ing fund to provide repayments.92 Two additional factors were
adopted from Hyperion Enterprises, including (1) the ratio of share-
holder loans to capital and (2) the amount or degree of shareholder
control. 93
Bankruptcy courts quickly stress that no one factor is controlling
and that recharacterization is determined on a case-by-case basis using
a balancing approach.94 Further, courts construe the factors within the
particular circumstances of each case. 95 The problem with adopting
such a broad array of factors to balance is that such an approach al-
lows judges to make subjective decisions. For example, in In re Atlan-
ticRancher Inc.,96 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that an advance made to an undercapitalized
debtor, which was unable to obtain financing from outside sources,
was an equity investment disguised as a loan. The court was persuaded
that the sophistication of the lender and the integrated set of loan
documents fundamentally required the debtor to treat the creditor as
if it were a substantial owner of the company rather than a simple
90. Id. at 749-750.
91. Brighton, supra note 15, at *4.
92. Brighton, supra note 15, at *3.
93. Brighton, supra note 1, at 18; See also Roth Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d at 800 F.2d 625; see
also, In re Autostyle Plastics Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 749-50 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Cold Harbor, 204
B.R. at 915.
94. Brighton, supra note 1, at 18.
95. Brighton, supra note 15, at *3.
96. Aquino v. Black (In re AtlanticRancher Inc.), 279 B.R. 411, 436 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
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lender.97 Specifically, the court found that the terms and conditions of
the loan gave the creditor control of the debtor's operations.98 How-
ever, the court also stipulated that the note and related agreements
regarding the transaction were properly documented with maturity
and interest rates, and the advance was treated as a debt on the
debtor's books.99 Nevertheless, the court found that the lender never
made any effort to collect on the promissory note or to foreclose on
the collateral. 0'° With respect to the transaction, the court held that
the claim should be properly recognized as an equity interest in the
debtor.' 0 '
On the other hand, in In re Phase I-Molecular Toxicology,10 2 the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico held that the
transaction was not a capital contribution but indicative of a debt. In
reaching its determination that the transaction involved a loan to the
debtor, the court was persuaded by the facts that title was given to the
instrument, a security agreement was entered into at or near the time
of the advances, the debtor pledged significant assets as security for
the notes, repayment of the loan was intended to be received from the
sale of assets and not completely dependent on the future success of
the debtor's business, and the notes contained an interest charge, al-
though the notes were not payable on demand and did not contain a
fixed maturity date. 03
F. Corporate Insiders and Fiduciaries
A claim for recharacterization is most often raised by creditors'
committees or a trustee in bankruptcy in cases where a lender is a
corporate insider, such as a shareholder, manager, or director. 1 4 A
corporation that is struggling to stay financially afloat requires addi-
tional funding in order to continue operating. 10 5 In many cases, corpo-
rations may be unable to obtain financing from outside commercial
lending institutions. 10 6 This may be a result of having their assets al-
97. Brighton, supra note 6, at 20, citing In re AtlanticRancher Inc., 279 B.R. at 436.
98. Brighton, supra note 6, at 20, citing In re AtlanticRancher Inc., 279 B.R. at 411.
99. Brighton, supra note 6, at 20, citing In re AtlanticRancher Inc., 279 B.R. at 437.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Farr v. Phase-I Molecular Toxicology, Inc. (In re Phase-I Molecular Toxicology), 287 B.R.
571, 578 (D. N.M. 2002).
103. Brighton, supra note 15, at 20, citing In re Phase-I Molecular Toxicology, 287 B.R. at 577.
104. Nozemack, supra note 8, at 705-706.
105. Markus C. Stadler, Treatment of Shareholder Loans to Undercapitalized Corporations in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 17 J.L. & COM. 1,1 (1997).
106. Stadler, supra note 106, at 2.
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ready over-encumbered. 107 Under such circumstances, corporate man-
agers, directors, and shareholders can choose to let the company die,
and file for bankruptcy, or they themselves can provide the necessary
financing. 10 8 If insiders take the latter route, they may choose to ad-
vance the needed funds by making additional capital contributions,
personally advancing funds to the company as a loan, or personally
guaranteeing a loan from an outside financial source. 10 9
Insiders are not blind to the fact that, in bankruptcy, holders of pro-
prietary interests in a corporation have the lowest priority and are
only repaid after all other claims of the estate are satisfied. 110 As a
holder of a debt instrument, an insider is put on the same footing as
the corporation's general creditors and has the ability to obtain a pro-
rate payment should the company file bankruptcy." 1 Thus, aware of
the financial risks, and the prospect that the company may be forced
to file bankruptcy nonetheless, corporate insiders may prefer to pro-
vide the funding in the form of a loan. However, a trustee in bank-
ruptcy or other creditor of the debtor-corporation alleges that the
insider-lender's advances were equity investments improperly camou-
flaged as a loan." 2 In effect, they seek to have a bankruptcy court
recharacterize the debt as equity, thus subordinating the insider's ad-
vance to the back of the repayment line." 3 When recharacterizing an
insider's debt claim, bankruptcy courts believe that they are achieving
an equitable remedy that protects legitimate creditors from those who
have attempted to improperly shift the risks of possessing an owner-
ship interest to the company's creditors by camouflaging their contri-
bution as a loan.114
III. ANALYSIS
This section argues that recharacterization is not an equitable rem-
edy, despite the assertions of bankruptcy courts that recognizing such
claims is an exercise of their powers as courts of equity. First, this
section asserts that recharacterization is inequitable because it is an
unauthorized exercise of bankruptcy courts' powers under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Further, this section argues that recharacerization is fun-
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2-3.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Nozemack, supra note 8, at 705-706.
113. Id.
114. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim?, supra note 25.
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damentally an inequitable remedy because it does not achieve a fair or
just outcome for all parties.
A. Beyond the Scope of Bankruptcy Courts' Equitable Powers
As a general rule, bankruptcy courts only possess the powers and
jurisdiction that are expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred
to them by statute. 115 The scope of bankruptcy courts' equitable pow-
ers are limited by the express statutory language of §105.116 Section
105(a) of the Code only permits bankruptcy courts to "issue any or-
der, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of" the Code.117 Therefore, the exercise of bankruptcy
courts' equitable powers are circumscribed, and under §105 must be
tied to another provision of the Code, and not merely used to carry
out a general bankruptcy concept or objective. 18 Thus, §105(a) does
not permit bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights or expand
the entitlements of creditors that are not already established under
the Code or non-bankruptcy law. 119
Accordingly, a proper application of §105(a) will effectuate the pro-
visions of the Code without fashioning or altering the substantive
rights of debtors or creditors, and without changing the fundamentals
of bankruptcy law regarding the validity of creditors' entitlements. 120
115. Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983), citing Chicago Bank of
Commerce 61 F.2d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 1932)("The appropriate starting point for our analysis is to
recognize the general rule that a bankruptcy court possesses only the jurisdiction and powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred by Congress."); see also Jones v. Kansas City
Garment Making Co., 1 F.2d 649, 650 (8th Cir. 1924)("Courts of bankruptcy are of statutory
origin and possess only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication
conferred upon them by the Bankruptcy Act.")
116. New England Dairies, Inc., v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart
Convenience Stores, Inc.) 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d. Cir. 2003)("The equitable power conferred on the
bankruptcy court by section 105(a) is the power to exercise equity in carrying out the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than to further the purposes of the Code generally, or otherwise
to do the right thing. This language "suggests that an exercise of section 105(a) power be tied to
another Bankruptcy Code section and not merely to a general bankruptcy concept or
objective.")
117. 11 U.S.C.S. §105(a) (emphasis added).
118. Phar-Mor, Inc., 166 B.R. at 61. Referring to §105(a), the court stated that "[tihis section
of the Code authorizes a court to use its equity powers to "fashion such orders as are necessary
to further the substantive provisions of the [Code]... However, while the grant of authority is
broad, a court may not create substantive rights in favor of a debtor that are in addition to the
rights bestowed by the Code if such rights do not also exist outside of bankruptcy law."); see also
Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) ("section 105(a)
'does not authorize the bankruptcy court to create rights not otherwise available under applica-
ble law."')
119. See supra note 118.
120. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 30; see also U.S. v. Noland 116 S.Ct. 1524 (1996); Raleigh v.
Ill. Dep't Rev., 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
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Although a majority of courts assert that under §510(c) they are al-
lowed to test the validity of claims, 121 bankruptcy courts are not au-
thorized in the name of equity to make a wholesale substitution of the
underlying law that controls the validity of creditors' entitlements. 122
Instead, the scope of bankruptcy courts' equitable powers must be un-
derstood in light of the principle of bankruptcy law that the validity of
a claim is generally a function of underlying substantive law.123 There-
fore, as mandated by §105(a), bankruptcy courts are confined to carry-
ing out the provisions of the Code when testing the validity of claims
in bankruptcy, regardless of how broad their equitable powers may
be. 124
In consideration of the limits that §105 places on the equitable pow-
ers of bankruptcy courts, recharacterization is outside the scope of
their authority under §510(c). There is no provision in the Code that
explicitly establishes a right of bankruptcy courts to recharacterize a
debt claim as an equity investment. 125 Since bankruptcy courts' equi-
table powers may only be utilized in carrying out the substantive pro-
visions of the Code, and there is no substantive right to recharacterize
debt under the Code, debt-to-equity recharacterization is beyond the
scope of bankruptcy courts' equitable powers. 126 Thus, recharacteriza-
tion is a judicially crafted "remedy" that directly contravenes §105(a).
Further, recharacterization improperly provides debtors and credi-
tors with greater rights than they would otherwise have if confined to
the provisions of the Code and non-bankruptcy law. 127 First, the
Bankruptcy Code only provides for the remedy of equitable subordi-
nation. By creating a wholly distinct remedy that is not authorized by
the Code, bankruptcy courts have given debtors and creditors entitle-
ments that exceed those explicitly set forth under the Code. As previ-
ously discussed, granting debtors and creditors greater rights than
121. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim?, supra note 25.
122. Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 24-25("Bankruptcy courts do indeed have some equitable powers to
adjust rights between creditors. See, e.g., §510(c). That is, within the limits of the Code, courts
may reorder distributions from the bankruptcy estate, in whole or in part, for the sake of treating
legitimate claimants to the estate equitably. But the scope of a bankruptcy court's equitable
power must be understood in the light of the principle of bankruptcy law discussed already, that
the validity of a claim is generally a function of underlying substantive law. Bankruptcy courts
are not authorized in the name of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law con-
trolling the validity of creditors' entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself
provides.")
123. Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 24-25.
124. Id.
125. Douglas, supra note 11, at 1.
126. Id.
127. New England Dairies, Inc., v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart
Convenience Stores, Inc.) 351 F.3d 86, 91-92 (2d. Cir. 2003).
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they already have under the Code and non-bankruptcy law is not au-
thorized. Permitting creditors and trustees in bankruptcy to bring
claims for recharacterization, which is not provided for under the
Bankruptcy Code, is to bestow upon them a greater basket of rights
and remedies that they are not entitled to carry.
Second, while the Code-provided remedy of equitable subordina-
tion permits bankruptcy courts to subordinate some or all of a claim,
recharacterization further expands the rights of creditors and debtors
since courts convert an entire claim when they recharacterize a debt.128
This conversion remands the claim to the back of the repayment line
since, as previously mentioned, an equity holder is paid only after all
other claims of a bankrupt corporation's estate are paid. Thus, the end
result achieved in a recharacterization claim provides only trustees
and complaining creditors with an "equitable" outcome. As courts of
equity, bankruptcy courts must consider all the equities of a case and
fashion a solution that is fair to all interested and affected parties, not
just one. 129 Recharacterization of a lender's entire claim as a capital
contribution does not achieve an equitable result for the lender who
intended to negotiate a debtor-creditor relationship. Recharacteriza-
tion instead results in an unjustified expansion of bankruptcy courts'
powers and the complaining creditors' and trustee's rights. It is not
equity that guides bankruptcy courts, but their unrestricted discretion
and self-expanded authority cloaked as a § 105 power.
There is no "equitable" outcome in a claim for recharacterization
when the end result directly contravenes the explicit provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, creates a cause of action and remedy not author-
ized by the Code, and permits creditors and debtors to obtain rights
they are otherwise not permitted to enjoy. Despite its reference as an
"equitable" remedy, recharacterization is a judicially created device
that enables creditors and trustees in bankruptcy to circumvent the
explicit provisions of the Code to the detriment of the lending
community.
B. A Faulty Framework
Despite its rough edges, debt-to-equity recharacterization is gener-
ating a rapidly developing body of case law. However, this considera-
bly undeveloped theory has correspondingly spawned conflicting
standards and inconsistent judicial decisions. The lack of a finite test
128. Brighton, supra note 1, at 67.
129. The Honorable Marcia S. Krieger, The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity: What
Does that Mean? 50 S.C. L. REv. 275 ,308 (1999) ("Courts of equity traditionally have taken into
account the equities - the concrete issues of fact and fairness of the particular situation.")
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that requires plaintiffs to prove the existence of certain factors, as op-
posed to simply allowing courts to "balance" any number of factors,
ensures the existence and development of an unpredictable and judi-
cially subjective area of law strife with conflict. Furthermore, the
framework that bankruptcy courts currently consult when analyzing
claims for recharacterization fails to achieve an equitable outcome.
First, there are no set elements that must be satisfied before a bank-
ruptcy court is allowed to recharacterize a debt and no requirement
that bankruptcy courts consider every Autostyle Plastics factor. Sec-
ond, a claim for recharacterization does not require a showing of bad
faith or misconduct on the part of a lender. Accordingly, it is easier for
a trustee or creditor to be successful in a recharacterization action
then in a claim for equitable subordination. 130
How Judicial Subjectivity Helps Fashion Confusion
Bankruptcy courts consistently reiterate that when analyzing a
claim for recharacterization no one factor is controlling or determina-
tive, and courts are to employ a balancing approach in reaching their
decision.' 3 ' While some bankruptcy courts employ all, or a majority,
of the Autostyle Plastics factors, other courts do not, nor are they
required to.132 In effect, there is no uniform standard that bankruptcy
courts across the country are required to use when analyzing a claim
for recharacterization. That is, there are no factors that a plaintiff is
required to show, or that a court is mandated to find, before a debt
may be recharacterized.
As a result, bankruptcy courts' decisions are inconsistent, unpredict-
able, and disturbingly subjective. An examination of the standards
that a court employed in one case may provide no indication of how it
might rule in a different case. For instance, while a court may consider
certain factors in analyzing one claim, it is in no way mandated to
consider those same factors in any subsequent case analysis and may
rely on wholly different factors in reaching its decision. This lack of
consistency stems from the failure to establish criteria that the courts
are required to fulfill before allowing a claim to be recharacterized.
Even more frustrating is the fact that the Autostyle Plastics factors
comprise a non-exhaustive list of criteria that courts may consider
130. Brighton, supra note 1, at 67. ("In recharacterization cases, there are no set elements that
must be satisfied, but there is an overall balancing of the factors to discern whether the obliga-
tion has the indicia of debt and was an arm's length transaction. Accordingly, in some ways it
may be easier to be successful in a recharacterization action.").
131. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 31.
132. Brighton, supra note 1, at 67.
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when analyzing a claim for recharacterization. Thus, bankruptcy
courts are allowed to consider other factors that they feel may help
them determine the "true" nature of a debt claim. Accordingly, it may
be easier for a creditor or trustee to succeed if they bring a cause of
action for recharacterization. 133
There is no fair or just result for a legitimate creditor who in good-
faith intended to enter into a debt transaction, but who has failed to
document the transaction according to the strictures of the bankruptcy
court, and watches as its debt is recharacterized. But with bankruptcy
judges subjectively fashioning their own rules regarding what they
consider to be a "legitimate" debt transaction, creditors may try in
good faith to fashion the transaction by following the court's approach
on Monday and nevertheless miss the boat if the court looks to a dif-
ferent set of Autostyle Plastics factors on Wednesday. Bankruptcy
courts' subjective selection of Autostyle Plastics factors enables them
to tip the scales against lenders, such as corporate officers, who may
have intended debt but watch as they slip to the back of the repay-
ment line.
The "free reign" that bankruptcy courts have when analyzing claims
for recharacterization has resulted in an area of law lacking any uni-
form standard. On the one hand, some bankruptcy courts engage in an
intense focus on the facts and a detailed analysis of the circumstances
under which advances are made to a corporation. 34 On the other
hand, some jurisdictions eschew any approach that is detailed and bal-
anced.1 35 These courts willingly recharacterize a transaction where
they find the existence of only a few factors, while disregarding the
fact that every other factor may indicate that the parties intended the
transaction to be a bona fide debt. 36 Arguably, the failure to follow a
finite test permits bankruptcy judges to craft opinions based on their
own subjectivity. For example, some courts in the Eleventh Circuit
willingly recharacterize a debt where a trustee can demonstrate that
either (1) the debtor was initially undercapitalized, or (2) the advance
was made during a time when no other disinterested lender would
have extended credit to the debtor.137 However, even if every other
133. Id.
134. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 31.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id., referring to Diasonic v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. at 631 ("The Eleventh Circuit...stated that
'shareholder loans may be deemed capital contributions in one of two circumstances: where the
trustee proves initial undercapitalization or where the trustee proves that the loans were made
when no other disinterested lender would have extended credit.' [This] standard is now the ap-
propriate standard to be used in this circuit."
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factor points to the existence of a genuine debt transaction, in both
situations the "lender" will lose. 138 Interestingly, however, this rule is
not universally followed in the Eleventh Circuit, and other courts in
that same jurisdiction apply the 13 Autostyle Plastics factors. 139 As
demonstrated by the courts of the Eleventh Circuit, there is no uni-
formity or consistency even within a jurisdiction.
Moreover, while some courts view certain factors as indicative of a
debt transaction, other courts may find these same factors as evidence
that a transaction was intended to be an equity investment. In a 2003
case decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Delaware, the court refused to recharacterize a debt transaction as
an equity investment. 140 In rejecting the plaintiff's request for
recharacterization, the court held that the insolvency of the debtor,
undercapitalization, inability to pay cash interest, and the fact that no
disinterested third-party lender other than the defendants-creditors
would lend money were not dispositive of equity.' 41 Further, the court
was not persuaded that the transaction was a capital contribution even
though the lender received a seat on the company's board and never
issued subsequent notes when additional funding was advanced to the
debtor.142
On the other hand, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts recharacterized a debt transaction as an equity
investment based on the existence of these same factors. 143 The court
found that inadequate capitalization at the time the funds were trans-
ferred, the lender's degree of control over the debtor, which included
significant involvement in the debtor's daily operations, the inability
to obtain funding from outside sources, and the lender's failure to
make any attempt to collect the debt were indicative that the transac-
tion involved a capital contribution.1 44 Thus, the District Court of Del-
aware refused to recharacterize a debt based on the existence of the
same factors that the District Court of Massachusetts found indicative
of a capital contribution. Such conflicting approaches illustrate the
lack of predictability that accompanies bankruptcy courts' decisions to
recharacterize a debt as equity.
138. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 31.
139. Id., referring to Celotex Corp. v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 176 B.R. 223, 248 (M.D.
Fla. 1994)(applying the 13-factor test).
140. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim?, supra note 25, discussing Cohen v. KB
Mezzanine Fund II, L.P. (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 291 B.R. 314, 314 (Bankr. D. De. 2003).
141. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim?, supra note 25.
142. Id.
143. Id., discussing Aquino v. Black 279 B.R. 411.
144. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim?, supra note 25.
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The lack of both consistency among courts and predictability in ju-
dicial reasoning is a cause for concern not only for lenders, but for
struggling companies as well. Judicial inconsistency "erodes the pre-
dictability of [the] investment mechanism," subjecting creditors and
companies to unanticipated risks.145 The drastically differing ap-
proaches of courts cultivate a lack of certainty as to the future of
transactions and affect the efforts of lenders currently structuring
transactions. 146 In order to maintain the viability of financing, lenders
and debtors must be able to rely on the form of the transaction and
the rights and obligations they bargained for. Recharacterization de-
stroys parties' reasonable expectations. A lack of certainty with re-
spect to how a transaction may later be characterized will most
assuredly reduce, if not extinguish, lenders' reliance on, and trust in,
the investment mechanism. 147
2. Where Is the Inequitable Conduct and Bad Faith?
Creditors and trustees may find that their best strategy for subordi-
nating a lender's claim is to bring a claim for recharacterization. In
some ways it is easier for a creditor or a trustee to succeed in a
recharacterization action.148 First, a claim for recharacterization does
not require a plaintiff to show misconduct on the part of the creditor.
Without the requirement of bad faith or misconduct on the part of a
lender, bankruptcy practitioners appear unwilling to support claims
for recharacterization. 149 Most bankruptcy courts exercise their pow-
ers of equity only after determining that a lender acted inequitably or
in bad faith, such as in a claim for equitable subordination.1 50 How-
ever, debt-to-equity recharacterization does not examine conduct or
harm, and there is no requirement that a trustee or creditor show the
existence of bad faith, misconduct, or otherwise inequitable behavior
on the part of a lender. 15' For example, under equitable subordina-
tion, the explicit Code-provided remedy, a plaintiff must show some
sort of inequitable conduct or bad faith on the part of a defendant-
creditor. Further, bankruptcy courts subordinate the claim only to the
extent necessary to offset injury to other creditors, which provides
145. Jeffrey E. Bjork, Seeking Predictability in Bankruptcy: An Alternative to Judicial
Recharacterization in Structured Financing, 14 BANK. DEV. J. 119, 122 (1997) (The author dis-
cusses judicial recharacterization in the context of securitization in the bankruptcy context.)




150. Nozemack supra note 7, at 692-693.
151. Sprayregen, supra note 13, at 1.
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bankruptcy courts discretion in determining how much a of a claim to
subordinate. On the other hand, there is no requirement of bad faith
or other inequitable conduct when bringing a claim for
recharacterization.
Bankruptcy courts speak of recognizing the "true" substance of a
"disguised" loan. That is, bankruptcy courts justify recharacterization
as necessary to recognize an equity investment that has been "camou-
flaged" as debt. But do words such as "disguised," "true," and "cam-
ouflaged" not suggest some sort of proactive conduct and bad-faith on
the part of the "lender?" To "disguise" requires that an act or practice
of concealment have been undertaken. 152
Moreover, as mentioned, the entire claim is converted into equity,
even though there is no requirement that the lender, in bad faith, in-
tended to camouflage the debt. Converting a lender's entire debt
claim into an equity contribution without a showing of some sort of
misconduct or bad faith is not consistent with bankruptcy courts' equi-
table mandate to produce "just and fair results to the end that fraud
will not prevail. 153
Second, in claims for equitable subordination, bankruptcy courts
only subordinate a misbehaving creditor's claim to the extent neces-
sary to offset specific harm suffered by creditors.154 Recharacteriza-
tion, on the other hand, effectuates conversion of a lender's entire
claim, and corresponding subordination to the end of the repayment
line. Consequently, it is all or nothing. Either the entire debt is recast
as equity or it is not. Thus, recharacterization provides complaining
creditors and trustees with a far superior outcome they would not
have had otherwise. Although bankruptcy courts possess some discre-
tion in equitably subordinating only part or all of a claim, recharacter-
ization enables a creditor or trustee to have an entire claim effectively
extinguished, since it is converted into an equity contribution.
Rechacterization can not be characterized as an equitable outcome for
good faith lenders who watch their claims completely converted ab-
sent evidence that demonstrates they intended to deceive other credi-
tors by acting in bad faith or otherwise inequitably.
IV. IMPACr
This section examines the negative effects that bankruptcy courts'
practice of debt-to-equity recharacterization has on struggling compa-
152. The Oxford Desk Dictionary and Thesaurus 214 (1997).
153. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, L.P. (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 291 B.R. 314, 322
(Bankr. D. De. 2003).
154. Trone v. Smith (In re Westgate-California Corp.), 642 F.2d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 1981).
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nies. Specifically, this section addresses how the inequitable remedy of
recharacterization impedes corporate and other lenders from resusci-
tating financially troubled companies. This section also reveals how
claims for recharacterization are being fashioned in other contexts.
A. Where Is Help When You Need It?
Although corporate investors should not be permitted to enjoy the
benefits of ownership while shifting the attendant risks of such invest-
ment to creditors, legitimate lenders must be protected from the risks
of recharacterization. 155 The current case law, however, creates a dis-
incentive for corporate insiders to lend additional funding to a strug-
gling corporation.1 56 As previously discussed, a financially troubled
company's most logical, and often only, source of additional funding
usually comes from corporate insiders.1 57 In a distressed situation,
these individuals are the parties most likely to advance much needed
funding since they already have a vested interest in the company.158
However, due to the inherent risks of advancing such funds, an insider
may insist that such investment be made as a loan, rather than as a
capital contribution.1 59 Bankruptcy courts' practice of debt-to-equity
recharacterization discourages insiders from providing a troubled
company with funding that may be necessary to keep it afloat. 160 Thus,
it is the financially troubled company that inevitably "feels the
pinch."161
First, the large number of factors that bankruptcy courts sift
through when analyzing the "true nature" of a transaction may deter
155. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 47; see also Markus C. Stadler, Treatment of Shareholder
Loans to Undercapitalized Corporations in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 17 J.L. & CoM. 1, 2 ("A
corporation facing financial trouble requires additional funds to be advanced in order to keep
the business operating. In most instances, corporations in bad financial shape already have all of
their assets over-encumbered with security interests. Thus, it is not possible to acquire loans
from outside financial sources since adequate security is not available. In this situation, share-
holders and directors have the option either to let the corporation go out of business and file a
petition for bankruptcy, or to advance the necessary funds themselves.")
156. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim?, supra note 25.
157. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 31.("Often, a company in financial distress may find its best
avenue for additional funds to be from insiders who already have a vested interest in the com-
pany. However, while such parties may be willing to make additional investments in such compa-
nies, they also understand the risks attendant with doing so. It is therefore common for such
investments to be made as loans rather than capital contributions.")
158. When Is Your "Debt" Claim Not a Debt Claim?, supra note 25.
159. Id.
160. Nozemack, supra note 7, at 715.
161. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 31. ("As would-be lenders tighten their purse-strings in re-
sponse to this [recharacterization] risk, it is the troubled small-to-medium-sized companies who
will feel the pinch.")
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insiders and other lenders from providing needed funding to a strug-
gling corporation. As inconsistent judicial interpretations of the
Autostyle Plastics factors demonstrate, the factors that bankruptcy
courts sort through when analyzing claims for recharacterization are
neither clearly dispositive of debt or equity. When evaluating the
"true" nature of a debt claim, separate courts have interpreted the
same Autostyle Plastics factors as indicative of both debt and equity.
This leaves the lender without any real ability to foresee how exactly a
court may view its claim. When the Autostyle Plastics factors can pro-
vide support for either debt or equity, lenders structuring loan trans-
actions may be reluctant to do so.
The failure to require that a plaintiff show bad faith or other inequi-
table conduct on the part of a lender will further deter insiders and
other corporate lenders from providing a troubled company with
needed funding. An insider or other lender who faces the possibility
of having their claim converted into an equity investment without any
showing that the lender acted inequitably or in bad faith, or in fact
intended to camouflage the transaction as debt, will be reluctant in
making a loan. 162
Recharacterization impedes investment in financially troubled com-
panies by the parties who may be the most logical and often only
source of much-needed funds. Corporate debtors and lenders need
predictability and stability.163 Further, the flow of business and fi-
nance require that courts respect and protect the parties' reasonable
expectations, especially where a creditor-debtor relationship has been
formed. 164 However, the risk of recharacterization operates as a detri-
ment to the reasonable expectations and bargained for rights and re-
sponsibilities of the parties. 165 It further operates to deter lenders
from rescuing financially troubled companies from the throes of
bankruptcy.
162. Nozemack, supra note 7, at 715. ("The bankruptcy courts' practice of recharacterizing
debt transactions... without inequitable conduct by the creditor will discourage insiders from
making loans to troubled companies. . .If the insider faces a possibility of its claim being
recharacterized and subordinated even without any inequitable conduct, it will think twice
before lending money to a debtor possibly nearing bankruptcy. This would make it nearly impos-
sible for companies... to borrow money when they need it the most.")
163. Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 47.
164. Id. ("Companies and investors need predictability, and the flow of business and finance
depends on the law's respect for, and protection of, the players' reasonable expectations.")
165. Id.
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B. The Expanding Realm of Recharacterization
Practioners are crafting recharacterization claims with mounting
creativity. 166 Moreover, debt-to-equity recharacterization is being
raised at an increasing rate, both informally as leverage in negotia-
tions, plan discussions, and case management, and formally in litiga-
tion. 167 Further, the failure of bankruptcy courts to establish concrete
guidelines has provided practioners much room for ingenuity when
developing a claim for recharacterization. 168 For example, it has been
found that recharacterization "has been raised in the context of
securitization transactions, letters of credit, and in the provision and
payment of guarantees."'1 69
Recharacterization has also been raised in bad-faith lending situa-
tions. 170 This argument entails that, to the extent there comes a "point
in a lending relationship where the lender knew or should have known
that there was no way the borrower could repay the obligations," and
the creditor had no expectation of repayment, "then, from that point
on, the obligations should be converted into an equitable contribu-
tion... ,171 At that point, the lender is presumed to share in future
risks of the business. 172 However, it has been argued that all lenders
presumably share in such risks of their borrower. 173
With an appreciation for the extent to which a claim for
recharacterization can be crafted, manipulated, and asserted in vary-
ing contexts, is it unrealistic to propose that not only is recharacteriza-
tion a detriment to advancement by insider-lenders, but the
commercial lending world as well? It is not unfathomable to assert
that recharacterization will have far-reaching implications for start-up
companies and small and medium-sized companies that seek funding
from the all-American Bank down on Main Street. It is not just in-
sider-lenders who will recoil, but, anticipatorily, the commercial lend-
ing branch down the street. With a majority of bankruptcy courts
ready and willing to recharacterize debt, and the creative endeavors of
practitioners coupled with the non-requirement that a showing of bad
faith or inequitable conduct be made, the recharacterization risk is
far-reaching.






172. Brighton, supra note 1, at 66.
173. Id.
142 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
V. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy courts lack the statutory authority to recharacterize a
debt claim as an equity investment. There is no provision in the Bank-
ruptcy Code that implicitly or explicitly permits bankruptcy courts to
recharacterize a debt as an equity investment. Further, bankruptcy
courts' equitable powers do not extend to recharacterizing debt. De-
spite its label as an "equitable remedy" by which the alleged "true
nature" of a claim is revealed, recharacterization fails to achieve an
equitable result for the parties involved, especially good-faith lenders
who intended to create a bona-fide debt transaction. It is a judicially
crafted cause of action that impermissibly expands the rights of credi-
tors and debtors in bankruptcy. Further, the "balancing approach"
used by bankruptcy courts when analyzing a claim for recharacteriza-
tion effectuates unpredictable and inequitable results, as well as in-
consistent standards in an area of law that is not even codified by
statute. As a result, recharacterization has disastrous implications for
potential lenders and may spell the end for financially struggling
companies.
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